2. Suppose two …rms wish to merge. They claim that the merger will bring large cost reductions but some people fear that the …rms just want to avoid competition. What would be your advice?
3. How should a monopoly be regulated when regulators do not know the cost function or the demand function of the monopolist?
4. How should it be determined whether or not a public facility -a road, a bridge, a stadium-should be constructed and who should pay for it?
5. Is justice possible in this world? Can we reconcile justice and self-interest? 6 . Can an uninformed planner achieve better allocations than those produced by completely-informed agents in an unregulated market?
7. In competitive ice skating, the highest and lowest marks awarded by judges are discarded and the remaining are averaged. Do you think that this procedure eliminates incentives to manipulate votes?
What kind of policies would you advocate to …ght Global Warming?
The answers to these questions are found in Section 6. The rest of this paper goes as follows. Section 2 is a historical introduction that can be skipped. Principle", Gibbard (1973) , Myerson (1979) , Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin (1979) and Harris and Townsend (1981) : If a mechanism yields certain allocations in equilibrium, telling the truth about one's characteristics must be an equilibrium as well (however, telling the truth may not be an equilibrium in the original mechanism you might have to use an equivalent direct mechanism).
This result is of utmost importance and it will be thoroughly considered in Section 3. However, it was somehow misread as "there is no loss of generality in focussing on incentive compatibility". But what the revelation principle asserts is that truthful revelation is one of the, possibly, many equilibria. It does not say that truthful revelation is the only equilibrium. As we will see in some cases it is a particularly unsatisfactory way of selecting equilibria.
The paper by Hurwicz (1959) , popularized by Reiter (1977) , presented a formal structure for the study of economic mechanisms which has been followed by all subsequent papers. Maskin (1999) , whose …rst version circulated in 1977, is credited as the …rst paper where the problem of multiple equilibria was addressed as a part of the model and not as an afterthought, see the report of the Nobel Prize Committee (2007). Maskin studied implementation in Nash equilibrium (see Glossary). Later his results were generalized to Bayesian Equilibrium by Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986) and Palfrey and Srivastava (1987) , (1989) .
Finally, Moulin (1979) studied Dominance Solvability and Moore and Repullo (1988) Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. The century closed with several characterizations on what can be implemented in other equilibrium concepts: Moore and Repullo (1990) in Nash Equilibrium, Palfrey and Srivastava (1991) in Undominated Nash Equilibrium, Jackson (1991) in Bayesian Equilibrium, Dutta and Sen (1991a) in Strong Equilibrium and Sjöström (1993) 
in Trembling Hand
Equilibria. With all these papers in mind, the basic aspects of implementation theory are now well understood.
The interested reader may complement the previous account with the surveys by Maskin and Sjöström (2002) and Serrano (2004) which cover the basic results and by Baliga and Sjöström (2007) for new developments including experiments.
See also Maskin (1985) , Moore (1992) , Corchón (1996) , Jackson (2001) and Palfrey (2002) . Several important applications of Implementation Theory are not surveyed here: Auctions, see Krishna (2002) , Contract theory, see La¤ont and Martimort (2001) , Matching, see Roth (forthcoming) and Moral Hazard see Ma, Moore and Turnbull (1988) . 5 
The Main Concepts
We divide this section into four subsections: The …rst describes the environment, the second deals with social objectives, the third revolves around the notion of a mechanism and the last de…nes the equilibrium concepts that we will use here.
The Environment
Let I = f1; :::; ng be the set of agents. Let i be the type of i. This includes all the information in the hands of i. Let i be agent i's type set. The set Q n i=1 i is the set of states of the world. For each 2 we have a feasible set A( ) and a preference pro…le R( ) = (R 1 ( ); :::; R n ( )). R i ( ) is a complete, re ‡exive and transitive binary relation on A( ). I i ( ) denotes the corresponding indi¤erence relation. Set A S 2 A( ). Let a = (a 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a n ) 2 A be an allocation, also written (a i ; a i ), where a i (a 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a i 1 ; a i+1 ; :::; a n ).
The standard model of an exchange economy is a special case of this model: is an economy. X i ( ) < k is the consumption set of i: w i ( ) 2 intX i ( ) are the endowments in the hands of i. The preferences of i are de…ned on X i ( ).
The set of allocations A( ) is de…ned as
(a ij +w ij ( )) 0; j = 1; 2; :::; k; (a i1 ; a i2 ; :::; a ik ) 2 X i ( ); 8i 2 Ig:
A special case of an exchange economy is bilateral trading: Here there are two agents, the seller and the buyer. The seller has a unit of an indivisible good and both agents are endowed with an in…nitely divisible good ("money").
Preferences are representable by linear utility functions. The type of each agent, also called her valuation, is the marginal rate of substitution between both goods. Finally, the set of types is a closed interval of the real line.
Another example is the social choice model where the set of states of the world is the Cartesian product of individual type sets, = Q n i=1 i . The set of feasible allocations is constant. The preferences of each agent only depend on her type, for all 2 ,
The model of public goods is a hybrid of the social choice and the exchange economy models. For a subset of goods, say 1; 2; :::; l, agents receive the same bundle (these are the public goods). For goods l + 1; :::; k, agents can consume possibly di¤erent bundles. 
Social objectives
Implementation begins by asking what allocations we want to achieve. In this sense, implementation theory reverses the usual procedure, namely, …x a mechanism and see what the outcomes are. The theory is rather agnostic as to who is behind we: It could be a democratic society, it could be a dictator, a benevolent planner, etc. Formally, a correspondence F :
A such that F ( ) A( ) for all 2 will be called a Social Choice Rule (SCR 
Mechanisms
If the information necessary to judge the desirability of allocations is in the hands of agents, it seems that the only way of retrieving this information is by asking them. But, of course, agents cannot be trusted to reveal truthfully their information because they might lose by doing so. Thus the owner of a defective car will think twice about revealing the true state of the car if the price of defective cars is less than the price of reliable cars. But perhaps we may design ways in which the messages sent by di¤erent agents are checked one against the other. We may also design ways in which agents send information by indirect means, say by raising ‡ags, making gestures, and so on and so forth. This is the idea behind the concept of a mechanism (also called a game form).
Formally, a mechanism is a pair (M; g) where M Q n 1 M i is the message space and g : M ! A is the outcome function. M i denotes agent i's message space with typical element m i . In some cases, i.e. when goods are indivisible, the outcome function maps M into the set of lotteries on A, denoted by LA.
In this case the outcome function yields the probability of obtaining an object.
Let m = (m 1 ; ::; m n ) 2 M , be a list of messages, also written (m i ; m i ) where m i is a list of all messages except those sent by i.
Another interpretation of a mechanism, more in tune with decentralized systems, is that messages describe contracts among agents and the outcome function is a legal system that converts contracts into allocations.
If feasible sets are state dependent we have a problem: Suppose that at we want to achieve allocation a 2 A( ): So there must be a message, say 
Equilibrium
Since the messages sent by agents are tied to their incentives, it is clear that we have to use an equilibrium concept borrowed from game theory. Thus, given 2 ; a mechanism (M; g) induces a game in normal form (M; g; ). There are many "solutions" to what would constitute an equilibrium. Let us begin by considering the notion of a Nash equilibrium
Let N E(M; g; ) be the set of allocations yielded by all Nash equilibria of (M; g; ). We now ask, given a SCR, what mechanism, if any, would produce outcomes identical to the SCR. In this sense, the mechanism is the variable of our analysis i.e. the mechanism "solves" the equation N E(M; g; ) = F ( ), for all 2 . Formally,
The SCR F is implementable in Nash equilibrium if there is a mechanism (M; g) such that, for all 2 ; N E(M; g; ) 6 = ; and:
1: F ( ) N E(M; g; ). The previous concept can be easily generalized. Given a mechanism (M; g)
an equilibrium concept is a mapping, say E (M;g) : A such that E (M;g) ( )
A( ) for all 2 . For instance E (M;g) ( ) may be the set of allocations arising from dominant strategy pro…les in when the mechanism (M; g) is in place. The notion of implementation in an equilibrium concept easily follows. See Thomson (1996) for a discussion of other concepts of implementation.
The problem is that some equilibrium concepts can not be written in the 
Thus, an equilibrium concept -given a mechanism-is a collection of functions,
the de…nition of implementable SCS in BE follows.
De…nition 4:
The mechanism (M; g) implements a SCS F in BE if:
1: For any BE s there exists x 2 F ( ), such that g(s( )) = x( ) for all 2 .
2: For any x 2 F , there is a BE s such that g(s( )) = x( ) for all 2 .
Looking at our de…nitions of an implementable SCR or SCS we see that the …rst requirement is that all equilibria yield "good" allocations. The second requirement is that given an allocation to be implemented, there is an equilibrium 9 "sustaining" this allocation. These two requirements bear some resemblance to the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics, namely that competitive equilibrium is e¢ cient and that any e¢ cient allocation can be achieved as a competitive equilibrium with the appropriate endowment redistribution. Notice that endowment redistribution is not used in the de…nition of implementation.
The Main Insights
We group our results here under three headings: The Revelation Principle and its consequences, Monotonicity and how to avoid it and the limits of design. We will discuss them each in turn.
The Revelation Principle and its Consequences
The de…nition of a mechanism is extremely abstract. No conditions have been imposed on what might constitute a message space or an outcome function.
And since implementation theory considers the mechanism the variable to be found, this is an unhappy situation: we are asked to …nd something whose characteristics we do not know! Fortunately the revelation principle comes to the rescue by stating a necessary condition for implementation: If a single valued SCR, which we will call a Social Choice Function (SCF) is implementable, there is a revelation mechanism for which telling the truth is an equilibrium. A revelation mechanism (associated with a SCF) is a mechanism in which the message space for each agent is her set of types and the outcome function is the SCF. We say that a SCF is truthfully implementable or incentive compatible if truth-telling is a Bayesian equilibrium (or a dominant strategy) of the direct mechanism associated with it. The following result formally states the revelation principle:
f is incentive compatible.
Proof. Let f be Bayesian implementable. Therefore, there exists a mechanism (M; g) and a Bayesian equilibrium s such that g(s ( )) = f ( ) for every
Which implies that 8
The proof for the case of dominant strategies is identical.
Theorem 1 (T.1 in the sequel) can be explained in terms of a mediator, i.e.
somebody to whom you say "who you are" and who chooses the strategy that maximizes your payo¤s on your behalf. Would you try to fool such a person? If you do so, you are fooling yourself because the mediator would choose a strategy that is not the best for you. Thus, the best thing for you to do is to tell the truth (providing an unexpected backing to the aphorism "honesty is the best policy"!).
Consider now the following results, due to Hurwicz (1972) (who proved it for the case of n = 2) and to Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) respectively.
Theorem 2. In exchange economies environments there is no SCF such that:
1) It is truthfully implementable in dominant strategies.
2) It selects individually rational allocations.
3) It selects e¢ cient allocations.
4) Its domain includes all economies with convex and continuous preferences.
Theorem 2'. In social choice environments there is no SCF such that:
2) It is non-dictatorial.
3) Its range is A, with #A > 2.
4) Its domain includes all possible preference pro…les.
It is clear that there are trivial SCF in which any three conditions in T. T. 1 and 2-2'imply that there is no mechanism implementing an e¢ cient and individually rational (resp. non-dictatorial) SCF in dominant strategies when the domain of the SCF is large enough. In other words, the revelation principle implies that the restriction to mechanisms where agents announce their own characteristic is not important when considering negative results. Thus, the Revelation principle is an appropriate tool for producing negative results. But we will see that to rely entirely on this principle when trying to implement a SCF may yield disastrous results.
A natural question to ask is what happens with the above impossibility results when we weaken the requirement of implementation in dominant strategies to that of implementation in Bayesian equilibrium. The following result, due to Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) , answers this question.
Theorem 2". In the bilateral trading environment there is no SCF such that:
1) It is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Equilibrium.
2) It selects individually rational allocations once agents learn their types.
3) It selects ex-post e¢ cient allocations.
4) Its domain includes all linear utility functions with independent types dis-
tributed with positive density and the sets of types have a nonempty intersection.
Proof. (Sketch, see Krishna and Perry [1997] for details) By the revenue equivalence theorem (see Klemperer, 1999 , Appendix A), all mechanisms ful…lling conditions 2) and 3) above raise identical revenue. So it is su¢ cient to consider the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves which, as we remarked before, is not e¢ cient.
Again the weakening of any condition in T.2" may produce positive results (Williams (1999) , Table 1 , presents an illuminating discussion of this issue). For instance, suppose seller valuations are 1 or 3, and buyer valuations are 0 or 2.
The mechanism …xes the price at 1.5 and a sale occurs when the valuation of the buyer is larger than the valuation of the seller. This mechanism implements truthfully a SCF satisfying 2) and 3) above. Unfortunately, it does not work when valuations are drawn from a common interval with positive densities.
But unlike T.2-2', there are robust examples of SCF truthfully implementable in Bayesian Equilibrium when conditions 2) or 4) are relaxed. Also, ine¢ ciency converges to zero very quickly when the number of agents increases (see Gresik and Satterthwaite, 1989) . This is because the equilibrium concept is now weaker and we are approaching a land where incentive compatibility has no bite, as we will see in T. 3 below. Suppose now that information is Non-Exclusive in the sense that the type of each player can be inferred from the knowledge of all the other players'type. Intuition suggests that in this case, incentive compatibility has no bite whatsoever (i.e. T2" does not apply) since the behavior of each player can be "policed" by the remaining players. In order to prove this, we will concentrate on an extreme, but illuminating, case of non-exclusive information, namely Nash equilibrium.
In this framework, since information is complete, a direct mechanism is one where each agent announces a state of the world.
Consider the following assumption:
This assumption will be called "universally worst outcome" because it postulates the existence of an allocation which is unanimously deemed as the worst.
In an exchange economy this allocation would be zero consumption for everybody. Now we have the following result (Repullo [1986] , Matsushima [1988] ):
Theorem 3. If n = 2 and W holds, any SCF is truthfully implementable in Nash Equilibrium. If n > 2, any SCF is truthfully implementable in Nash Equilibrium.
Proof. When n = 2 consider the following outcome function: g(
00 ) = z for all 0 6 = 00 . Clearly, truth is an equilibrium. When n > 2, consider the following outcome function: If m is such that n 1 agents
Clearly truth is an equilibrium as well in this case :
The …rst thing to notice is the di¤erence between the cases of two and more than two individuals. We will have more to say about this in the next section.
The second is that the construction in Theorem 3 produces a large number of equilibria, and that there seems to be no good reason for individuals to coordinate in the truthful equilibria.
For instance, suppose workers can be either …t or un…t. When a pro…t-maximizing …rm asks its employees about their characteristics, and all workers are …t, a unanimous announcement such as "we are all un…t" is an equilibrium.
If …t workers are required hard work and un…t workers are asked to light work, do you think it is reasonable that workers coordinate in the truthful equilibrium?
A more elaborate example was produced by Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986):
There are three agents. The …rst agent has no information and agents 2 and 3 are perfectly informed. The ranking of agent 1 over alternatives is the opposite of agents 2 and 3 who share the same preferences. The SCF is the top alternative of agent 1 in each state. It is intuitively clear that besides the truthful equilibria, there is another untruthful equilibrium where both informed agents lie and they 14 are strictly better o¤ than under truthful behavior. Again, coordination in the truthful equilibrium seems very unlikely. Thus, we have to recognize that we have a problem here. The next section will tell you how we can solve it.
Summing up, what do we learn from the results in this section?
1. When looking for an implementable SCF, a useful …rst test is whether this SCF yields incentives for the agents to tell the truth, see T.1. But this test is incomplete because of the existence of equilibria other than the truthful one, see T.3. These untruthful equilibria sometimes sound more plausible than the truthful one. 
Monotonicity and how to avoid it
We have seen that equilibria other than the truthful one are likely to arise. We have also seen that these equilibria cannot be disregarded a priori. 
Monotonicity says that if an allocation is chosen in state and this allocation doesn't fall in anybody's ranking in state 0 , this allocation must also be chosen in 0 . We will also speak of a "monotonic transformation of preferences at " when the requirement aR i ( )b ! aR i ( 0 )b 8i 2 I is satis…ed. This requirement simply says that the set of preferred allocations shrinks when we go from to 0 .
Monotonicity looks like a not unreasonable property, even though as we will see in a moment, there are cases in which it is incompatible with other very desirable properties. In any case the importance of monotonicity comes from the fact that it is a necessary condition for implementation in Nash Equilibrium, as proved by Maskin (1977) .
Theorem 4. If a SCR is implementable in Nash Equilibrium it is Monotonic.
Proof. If F is Nash implementable, there must be a mechanism (M; g) such that 8a 2 F ( ), there is a Nash equilibrium m , such that g(m ) = a. Since
Let us now discuss the concept of monotonicity. The …rst condition is a rather modest requirement on the richness of the domain of F . The second is a non-discrimination property which says that if everybody considers two allocations to be indi¤erent and one allocation belongs to the SCR then it must be the other. Now we have the following:
Theorem 5. Let F be a SCR satisfying L and ND and such that:
1) It is Nash implementable.
Then, if x is a Walrasian allocation at , x 2 F ( ).
Proof. (Sketch, see Thomson (1985) for details) Take an economy . Let x be a Walrasian allocation for . Consider a new economy, called L , where the marginal rates of substitution among goods are constant and equal to a vector of Walrasian prices. By individual rationality, F must select an allocation which is
Thus under weak conditions, Walrasian allocation are always in the set of those selected by a Monotonic SCR. And these allocations may fail to satisfy properties of fairness or justice as pointed out by the critics of the market. Under stronger assumptions, the converse is also true, i.e. only Walrasian allocations can be selected by a Nash implementable SCR, Hurwicz (1979) . Also, T. 5 has the following unpleasant implication.
Theorem 6. There is no SCF in exchange economies such that:
3) ND holds.
4) It is de…ned on all exchange economies.
Proof. T. 5 implies that any Walrasian allocation belongs to the allocations selected by F . Since Walrasian equilibrium is not unique for some economies in the domain, hence the result. :
T. 6 has a counterpart in social choice domains, Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) .
Theorem 6'. There is no SCF in a social choice domain such that:
1) It is monotonic.
2) It is not dictatorial.
3) Its range is A with #A > 2.
4) It is de…ned on all possible preferences.
An implication of T. 6-6'is that single valued SCR are still problematic. But the consideration of multivalued SCR, brings a new problem: The existence of several Nash equilibria. For instance, if a; b 2 F ( ) with a and b being e¢ cient allocations, agents play a kind of "Battle of the Sexes" game with no clear results. Moreover the Nash Equilibrium in mixed strategies may yield allocations outside F ( ) (the concern about mixed-strategy equilibria was …rst raised by Jackson [1992] ). Now let us come to the good news. Firstly, the ND condition, which is essential for T. 5 to hold, is not as harmless as it appears to be. For instance, it is not satis…ed by the Envy-Free SCR, see Thomson (1987) for a discussion. faR i ( )b; 8b 2 A; for at least n 1 agentsg ! a 2 F ( ) In other words, if there is an allocation which is top-ranked by, at least, n 1 agents, NVP demands that this allocation belongs to the SCR. This sounds like 18 a reasonable property for large n. Also in exchange economies with strictly increasing preferences and more than two agents, NVP is vacuously satis…ed because there is no top allocation for n 1 agents.
The following positive result, a relief after so many negative results, was stated and proved by Maskin (1977) , although his proof was incomplete. The interpretation of the mechanism given in the proof of T. 7 is that if everybody agrees on the state and the allocation is what the planner wants, this allocation is selected. If there is a dissident (a term due to Danilov [1992] )
she can make her case by choosing an allocation (a "test allocation") in her lower contour set, as announced by others. Finally, with more than one dissident, it's the jungle! Any agent can obtain her most preferred allocation by the choice of an integer. Typically, there is no equilibrium in this part of the mechanism.
Notice that (M) is just used to eliminate unwanted equilibria.
The mechanism is an "augmented" revelation mechanism (a term due to T. 7 was the …rst positive …nding of implementation theory. And it prompted researchers to be more ambitious: Can we implement without Monotonicity? An interesting observation, due to Matsushima (1988) and Abreu and Sen (1991) , is that if agents have preferences representable by von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, any SCR can be "virtually implemented" in the sense that the set of allocations yielded by Nash equilibria is arbitrarily close to the set of desired allocations. This is because, as we saw before, any SCR mapping in the interior of LA is Monotonic. Thus allocations in the boundary can be arbitrarily approximated by allocations in the interior.
A more satisfying approach was introduced by Moore and Repullo (1988) by introducing subgame perfection as the solution concept. It is not possible to explain fully this approach here because it would take us too far; in particular the notion of a mechanism must be generalized to "stage mechanism". Instead,
we give a result that conveys the force of subgame perfect implementation. It Moore and Repullo proved that many SCR which could not be implemented in Nash Equilibrium can be implemented in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. This is because subgames can be designed to kill unwanted equilibria without using monotonicity. Their result was improved upon by Abreu and Sen (1991) . The problem with this approach is that the concept of subgame perfection is problematic because it requires that, no matter what has happened in past, in the remaining subgame, players are rational, even if this subgame was attained because some players made irrational choices.
The Moore-Repullo result was not only important by itself but it opened the way to the consideration of other equilibrium concepts that allow very permissive results. For instance, Palfrey and Srivastava (1991) proved the following result Theorem 8'. Any SCR satisfying NVP is implementable in Undominated Nash Equilibrium.
At this point, it seemed that by invoking the adequate re…nement of Nash equilibrium, any SCR could be implemented. But the implementing mechanisms were getting weird and some people were beginning to get suspicious. Why and how is discussed in the next section. 
The Limits of Design
So far we have assumed that there are no limits to what the designer can do. She can pick up any mechanism with no restrictions on its shape. This procedure, indeed, pushes the possibilities of design to the limit. But by doing this, we have learnt a good deal about the limitations of the theory of implementation.
It is fair to say that today the consensus is that there are some extra properties which should be considered when designing an implementing mechanism. We review here …ve approaches to this question. Those agents who eliminate dominated strategies are unable to make a choice.
These constructions eliminate unwanted equilibria, which as we saw before, is the problem with Nash implementation. Jackson illustrates his point by showing that under no restrictions on mechanisms, any SCR can be implemented in undominated strategies, a weak solution concept. Then he requires that the mechanism be Bounded in the following sense: whenever a strategy m i is dominated, there is another strategy dominating m i and which is undominated.
He shows that implementation in undominated strategies with bounded mechanisms result many times in incentive compatibility, which as we saw in Section 22 3 is a hard requirement. This shows the bite of the boundedness assumption.
However, in the case of implementation with undominated Nash equilibrium, the boundedness assumption has little impact, see Jackson, Palfrey, and Srivastava (1994) and Sjöström (1994) . The …rst of these papers introduced a related requirement, the Best Response Property: for every strategy played by the other agents, each agent has a best response.
2: Natural Mechanisms. Given that we have run so far from the kind of mechanism we are used to, it seems reasonable to ask what can be implemented by mechanisms that resemble real-life mechanisms. These mechanisms must be simple too because simplicity is an important characteristic in practice.
Let us call them Natural Mechanisms. 3: Credibility. Another implicit assumption is that once the mechanism is in place, there is no way to stop it. Thus, if for some m, g(m) is a "universally worst outcome", the planner has to deliver this allocation even if she is trying to implement a Pareto E¢ cient allocation. Is this a credible procedure? In many cases, if the planner is a real person it seems that she would do her best to avoid g(m)! Here we have two possibilities: Either we identify additional constraints on the planner that look reasonable or we jump to model the planner as a full‡edged player. The …rst road leads us to identify a subset of allocations of A, say X, which can never be used by the mechanism. For instance, in Chakravorty,
Corchón and Wilkie (2006) X is the set of allocations that are never selected by the SCR for some state of the world, i.e. X = fa 2 A=@ 2 ; a 2 F ( )g. The motivation for this de…nition is that it hardly seems credible that the planner can choose an allocation that is never intended to be implemented. Rede…ning the allocation set as A AnX the de…nitions of a mechanism and an implementable SCR can be easily translated in this framework. However, depending on the domain, SCR that are monotonic when de…ned on A are no longer monotonic when de…ned on A: For instance, the (constrained) Walrasian SCR. Thus, these SCR can not be implemented when the planner can only use allocations in A: A weakness of this approach is that the list of reasonable constraints on allocations may be large. The second possibility drives us to model implementation as a signalling game where the planner receives signals -messages-from the agents, updates her beliefs and then chooses an allocation which maximizes her expected utility (Baliga, Corchón and Sjöström [1997] ). Again, some SCR that are Nash implementable, are not implementable in this framework. However, in this case there are SCR that are not Nash implementable but are implementable in this framework. This is because the model takes a basic assumption of game theory to the limit, namely, that agents know the strategies of other players. In this case, the planner knows if a report on agents'types is truthful or not before the allocation is delivered! 4: Renegotiation. Another strong assumption is that the mechanism prescribes actions that can not be changed by agents. This contradicts experiences such as black markets where agents trade on the existing goods (Hammond [1987] ). A way of modelling this is to assume that agents are able to renegotiate some allocations (Maskin and Moore [1999] . Renegotiation in a dif- Summing up, it is now clear that implementing mechanisms can not be just "anything". Their features matter. Demanding that mechanisms satisfy the best response property, be simple, not use extreme allocations, be robust to the possibility of renegotiation and implement in several equilibrium concepts makes our lives more di¢ cult but makes our models a great deal better. 3. Dynamic Implementation. The theory presented here is static but there are some papers dealing with implementation in dynamic set-ups. We mention a few: Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole (1985) studied the "Ratchet Effect", where …rms underproduce for fear of being asked to do too much in the future. Kalai and Ledyard (1988) showed that if the planner is su¢ ciently patient, every SCR is dominant-strategy implementable. Burguet (1990/94) showed that the revelation principle does not hold when outcomes are chosen in In this case a mechanism must implement regardless the structure of information, i.e. priors of agents, type spaces, etc. Corchón and Ortuño-Ortín (1995) approached the problem by assuming that the economy is composed of "islands" and that there is complete information inside each island. A mechanism robustly implements a SCR if it does it in BE for every possible prior (compatible with the island assumption) and in Uniform Nash Equilibrium. The latter requires that an equilibrium strategy for an agent must be the best reply to what other agents in the island play and to any possible message sent by agents outside the island when they follow their equilibrium strategies (D'Aspremont and GerardVaret [1979] ). They showed that any SCR satisfying M and NVP is robustly implementable (a later contribution by Yamato (1994) showed that Robust and Nash Implementation coincide in this framework). The same concern has been approached in a series of papers by Bergemann and Morris (see e.g. [2005]) where they ask SCR to be implemented whatever the players'beliefs and higher order beliefs about other player'types. Artemov, Kunimoto and Serrano (2007) require implementation for the payo¤ type space and the space of …rst-order beliefs about other agents'payo¤ types. They obtain very permissive results.
In a di¤erent vein, Koray (2005) , has argued that, since priors are not contractible, the regulator needs to be regulated in order to stop her from manipulating the priors. He shows that the outcomes of this game vary over a wide spectrum. Again the need of prior-free implementation is clear. ) show that under a condition that is ful…lled in several standard IO models, the SCR that maximize social surplus can be implemented by a dominance solvable mechanism with budget balance.
3. There is a very simple mechanism which attains maximum surplus, Loeb and Magath (1979) . But in this mechanism the monopolist receives all the surplus and the demand function must be known by the planner. These points were worked out by subsequent contributions from Baron and Myerson, Lewis and Sappington, Sibley and others. 4 . By now the reader should know the di¢ culties of implementing e¢ cient public decisions. When information is exclusive this is impossible, even though an approximate e¢ cient decision can be obtained when the number of agents is large. When information is complete, we have seen several examples of mechanisms implementing e¢ cient outcomes.
5. There is no di¤erence between implementing market or fair outcomes.
Both have to pass the same tests, i.e. incentive compatibility, monotonicity and simplicity/credibility of design. In exchange economies, Thomson (2005) presents a simple and elegant mechanism that implements envy-free allocations in Nash Equilibrium. In cooperative production, Corchón and Puy (2002) presented a family of mechanisms that implement in Nash Equilibrium any e¢ cient SCR where the distribution of rewards is a continuous function of e¤orts.
6. Yes! An uninformed planner can set up a mechanism that yields e¢ cient outcomes in circumstances where the market yields ine¢ cient allocations, i.e. under externalities or public goods see Point 5 in 4.3 above. All we need is nonexclusive information and that the SCR be Monotonic, the latter requirement 28 can be skipped under re…nements of Nash Equilibrium.
7. Not completely. Suppose complete information among three or more judges and that they all perceive the same quality of a given performance.
Clearly, truth is an equilibrium, because if all judges minus you tell the truth you cannot change the outcome by saying something di¤erent. Unfortunately, any unanimous announcement is also an equilibrium by the same reason. Thus we are in a situation akin to T. developed incentive compatibility in a di¤erentiable framework.
